God Made It So
Some scientists probe the deepest recesses of outer space hoping to solve the riddle of existence: the origin and meaning of the universe and, indeed, of life. Other scientists probe deeper and deeper into sub-atomic matter in search of these same insights. The nobility of their struggle and the great expertise required to pursue it seem to mask the absurdity of theory in search of its own foundation. Scientific enterprise works because the universe is what it is; meanwhile scientists engage the scientific enterprise in an effort to discover the nature of the universe! This speaks to a dramatic difference between those who launched the modern scientific enterprise and those today who claim to be their heirs: early-modern scientists worked from a fundamental conviction concerning the basic nature of reality; late-modern scientists are on a quest to discover the basic nature of reality.
In the Middle Ages the simplest Christian peasant shared in communion with the greatest genius of early-modern science in that both held as the basic starting point of all their life and thought the common confession: God made it so. The scientist surely elaborated a great deal upon this theme beyond the capabilities of the peasant, but nothing proposed by early-modern scientists overturned the peasant's basic confession, for this remained as well the scientist's basic confession. We may not say that everyone who was involved in the early-modern scientific revolution personally confessed Christianity. However, they worked within the intellectual and cultural milieu engendered by the Church, particularly by the Doctrine of Creation, and could not otherwise have built modern science. When the peasant confronted the simplest questions concerning the operation of the physical world and could say no more than, "God made it so," he uttered precisely that which the greatest scientific genius was obliged to grasp as the foundational premise of all his subsequent insights. The peasant and the scientist built upon a common foundation; the difference between them was that the scientist built a higher edifice.
The outlook of the late-modern scientist is a vastly different thing altogether. The confession, "God made it so," though it be the chief cornerstone, has become, in the eyes of the late-modern scientist, a stone which this would-be builder has rejected. It is not allowed as the foundational premise of all that he is about, and if it is to be allowed at all it would be only later, as a possible conclusion. However, this confession is not, and cannot be, the conclusion of any process of reasoning, for it is, and must be, the foundation of all valid reasoning. Having rejected this confession as the foundation of their scientific enterprise, late-modern scientists are quite consistent in ruling it out of possibility as a conclusion. Concerning the mysteries of the Universe that science cannot explain, Otto Frisch, physicist and coiner of the phrase "nuclear fission," said, "It would be defeat for a scientist to accept the answer, 'because God made it so'."[1] His position is self-defeating because it destroys the validity of inductive reasoning.
The modern scientific method is founded upon the principle of observation and inductive reasoning. This approach to reality was not unknown in Ancient times, but neither was it accepted as a valid means of gaining knowledge of reality. According to science historian Alan G. R. Smith, "It is true that, unlike Plato and his followers, Aristotle and his supporters did seriously discuss the inductive method - the building of theories on observed facts - but this was not central to the Aristotelian idea of science, which was based essentially on definitions of the 'nature' or 'essence' of a thing." [2] Aristotle himself said, "Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception." [3] The methodology of observation and inductive reasoning became the basis of a revolutionary new approach to science in the later Middle Ages on the strength of the Christian Doctrine of Creation. Philosopher of Science A. N. Whitehead has said that, "…faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from Medieval theology…I mean the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible labours of scientists would be without hope." [4]
Inductive reasoning begins with particulars and seeks to arrive at generalities. General principles come into view by weight of repeated observation of reproducible results. However, the inductive reasoning process does not begin with a blank slate. At the outset of inductive reasoning there is of necessity a full range of assumptions regarding the nature of human perception and the surrounding world. First, one must assume that his sensory perception really does convey to him something of the true nature of an external world. Next, there must be an assumption that the external world has an order, that it rightly may be conceived as a "universe." Finally, there must be an assumption that perceptions of this world rightly may be conceived as "data." These assumptions constitute generalities that cannot themselves be produced by any inductive reasoning process. Inductive reasoning cannot arrive at a conclusion that reality is an ordered Universe; rather, a fundamental conviction that reality is an ordered Universe must already be in place in order for inductive reasoning to have any validity.
The assumptions undergirding inductive reasoning find firm foundation only in the Christian Doctrine of Creation. We cannot discover ourselves to be sentient of an ordered Universe; we know ourselves to be so on the authority of our Creator. The only reason that the enterprise of science has not come to an abrupt halt in the late-modern world is because late-modern scientists carry on in the momentum of the early-modern scientific revolution and in dishonesty to their own Evolutionary Atheism. Their position is intellectually dishonest in that they continue to pretend that autonomous human analysis can derive a comprehensive and unified world and life view, when it has been known for at least two thousand years that autonomous human analysis leads only and directly to irresolvable dialectical tensions: this is exactly what Aristotle and ancient philosophers generally struggled with. Unbelievers may carry on only in inconsistency to their unbelief.
The confession, "God made it so," is not an anti-intellectual escape for those who cannot grasp or will not accept scientific thought. It is the necessary starting point and basic motive of all true scientific thought. The simplest of men who confess, "God made it so," thereby grasp the foundation of wisdom (Pr. 9:10). This is the very same foundation grasped by those who launched the enterprise of modern science, and this accounts for how and why they were able to launch it. Late-modern Evolutionary Atheism is an intellectually dishonest escape for those who refuse to bow before their Creator.
[1] Otto Frisch, "Why?" in Duncan, Weston-Smith, eds., "The Encyclopedia of Ignorance" (New York: Wallaby, 1977), p.2
[2] Alan G. R. Smith, "Science and Society" (London: Thames & Hudson, 1972), p.49-50
[3] Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics" Bk. I, Ch. 31
[4] A. N. Whitehead, "Science and the Modern World", 1967, cited in James T. Cushing, "Philosophical Concepts in Physics" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 145.
In the Middle Ages the simplest Christian peasant shared in communion with the greatest genius of early-modern science in that both held as the basic starting point of all their life and thought the common confession: God made it so. The scientist surely elaborated a great deal upon this theme beyond the capabilities of the peasant, but nothing proposed by early-modern scientists overturned the peasant's basic confession, for this remained as well the scientist's basic confession. We may not say that everyone who was involved in the early-modern scientific revolution personally confessed Christianity. However, they worked within the intellectual and cultural milieu engendered by the Church, particularly by the Doctrine of Creation, and could not otherwise have built modern science. When the peasant confronted the simplest questions concerning the operation of the physical world and could say no more than, "God made it so," he uttered precisely that which the greatest scientific genius was obliged to grasp as the foundational premise of all his subsequent insights. The peasant and the scientist built upon a common foundation; the difference between them was that the scientist built a higher edifice.
The outlook of the late-modern scientist is a vastly different thing altogether. The confession, "God made it so," though it be the chief cornerstone, has become, in the eyes of the late-modern scientist, a stone which this would-be builder has rejected. It is not allowed as the foundational premise of all that he is about, and if it is to be allowed at all it would be only later, as a possible conclusion. However, this confession is not, and cannot be, the conclusion of any process of reasoning, for it is, and must be, the foundation of all valid reasoning. Having rejected this confession as the foundation of their scientific enterprise, late-modern scientists are quite consistent in ruling it out of possibility as a conclusion. Concerning the mysteries of the Universe that science cannot explain, Otto Frisch, physicist and coiner of the phrase "nuclear fission," said, "It would be defeat for a scientist to accept the answer, 'because God made it so'."[1] His position is self-defeating because it destroys the validity of inductive reasoning.
The modern scientific method is founded upon the principle of observation and inductive reasoning. This approach to reality was not unknown in Ancient times, but neither was it accepted as a valid means of gaining knowledge of reality. According to science historian Alan G. R. Smith, "It is true that, unlike Plato and his followers, Aristotle and his supporters did seriously discuss the inductive method - the building of theories on observed facts - but this was not central to the Aristotelian idea of science, which was based essentially on definitions of the 'nature' or 'essence' of a thing." [2] Aristotle himself said, "Scientific knowledge is not possible through the act of perception." [3] The methodology of observation and inductive reasoning became the basis of a revolutionary new approach to science in the later Middle Ages on the strength of the Christian Doctrine of Creation. Philosopher of Science A. N. Whitehead has said that, "…faith in the possibility of science, generated antecedently to the development of modern scientific theory, is an unconscious derivative from Medieval theology…I mean the inexpugnable belief that every detailed occurrence can be correlated with its antecedents in a perfectly definite manner, exemplifying general principles. Without this belief the incredible labours of scientists would be without hope." [4]
Inductive reasoning begins with particulars and seeks to arrive at generalities. General principles come into view by weight of repeated observation of reproducible results. However, the inductive reasoning process does not begin with a blank slate. At the outset of inductive reasoning there is of necessity a full range of assumptions regarding the nature of human perception and the surrounding world. First, one must assume that his sensory perception really does convey to him something of the true nature of an external world. Next, there must be an assumption that the external world has an order, that it rightly may be conceived as a "universe." Finally, there must be an assumption that perceptions of this world rightly may be conceived as "data." These assumptions constitute generalities that cannot themselves be produced by any inductive reasoning process. Inductive reasoning cannot arrive at a conclusion that reality is an ordered Universe; rather, a fundamental conviction that reality is an ordered Universe must already be in place in order for inductive reasoning to have any validity.
The assumptions undergirding inductive reasoning find firm foundation only in the Christian Doctrine of Creation. We cannot discover ourselves to be sentient of an ordered Universe; we know ourselves to be so on the authority of our Creator. The only reason that the enterprise of science has not come to an abrupt halt in the late-modern world is because late-modern scientists carry on in the momentum of the early-modern scientific revolution and in dishonesty to their own Evolutionary Atheism. Their position is intellectually dishonest in that they continue to pretend that autonomous human analysis can derive a comprehensive and unified world and life view, when it has been known for at least two thousand years that autonomous human analysis leads only and directly to irresolvable dialectical tensions: this is exactly what Aristotle and ancient philosophers generally struggled with. Unbelievers may carry on only in inconsistency to their unbelief.
The confession, "God made it so," is not an anti-intellectual escape for those who cannot grasp or will not accept scientific thought. It is the necessary starting point and basic motive of all true scientific thought. The simplest of men who confess, "God made it so," thereby grasp the foundation of wisdom (Pr. 9:10). This is the very same foundation grasped by those who launched the enterprise of modern science, and this accounts for how and why they were able to launch it. Late-modern Evolutionary Atheism is an intellectually dishonest escape for those who refuse to bow before their Creator.
[1] Otto Frisch, "Why?" in Duncan, Weston-Smith, eds., "The Encyclopedia of Ignorance" (New York: Wallaby, 1977), p.2
[2] Alan G. R. Smith, "Science and Society" (London: Thames & Hudson, 1972), p.49-50
[3] Aristotle, "Posterior Analytics" Bk. I, Ch. 31
[4] A. N. Whitehead, "Science and the Modern World", 1967, cited in James T. Cushing, "Philosophical Concepts in Physics" (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 145.
