Tuesday

Metaphysics of Discrimination

Now and then one still may see commercial advertising that appeals to the "discriminating consumer." We may be assured that marketers in these cases are not suggesting that their products are likely to appeal only to those who harbor a non-rational dislike of Black people. No one would seriously suggest that this is what is meant, and the true meaning of "discriminating consumer" easily is perceived by all. At the same time a radically different idea of what it means to "discriminate" is in common usage in social and political circles. How can marketers on the one hand flatter consumers as being "discriminating" - as though this were a great virtue - and on the other hand everyone understands that in social and political life it is the height of evil to be "discriminating"?

As do many words in the English language, the term discriminate has a wide variety of derivatives and usages. As a personal quality it is a Verb Intransitive. It takes no direct object, but applies to objects outside the subject only indirectly, and then not an individual object singly, but a range of objects among which one makes distinctions. Discriminate comes from the Latin discriminare, "to distinguish," which in turn is derived from discrimen, "a sifting-out." Discrimination is the ability to distinguish one thing from another according to technical or aesthetic criteria, i.e. to make "sifting-out" sorts of distinctions, such as superior vs. inferior, or pleasant vs. repugnant, or simply preferred vs. unappealing. This is precisely the personal quality in view in the commercial advertising. The reason this advertising flattery works is because discrimination in reality is a very desirable and valuable trait. This commercial usage gets at the true and essential meaning of the term.

The accepted social and political "wisdom" casts the personal quality of discrimination in a radically opposite light. This is not because of any radical variant of usage; even in social and political usage discriminate still means the ability to make distinctions among things. The vice of social and political discrimination is said to be, not that distinctions among men are identified incorrectly, but that they are identified at all. The outcry over discrimination is based on the dogma that no meaningful distinctions leading to a judgment of technical or aesthetic superiority may rightly or morally be made among men. One keenly may discriminate among products offered on the market, but his finely honed skill of discrimination is not allowed any meaningful or moral use in his social or political relations with his fellow men. The dogma provides that men are to be esteemed according to their potential, not their actual, traits, and that all individual potential is identical because unlimited.

Of course, the popular social dogma is wrong (Rom. 12:3-6). Men vary widely in both their potential and actual traits. There are in fact distinctions to be made among men that lead directly to determinations of technical and/or aesthetic (objective and/or subjective) superiority. The outcry over discrimination is characterized as motivated by a desire to lift up the rejected. However, the proper means of the unqualified rising in status is through the diligence necessary to become qualified, not by the imposition of a moral ban on discrimination. The pursuit of status via the pursuit of excellence is in keeping with the true essence of discrimination, which principally is the exercise of finding and embracing the superior. Anti-discrimination actually is a straw-man position, for it pretends to reverse the true essence of discrimination, and would characterize it as principally an exercise of exclusion.

However, the unqualified or unappealing are not the principal objects of an exercise of discrimination. Discrimination is essentially a determination to apprehend the superior, not to banish the inferior. There is a certain amount of self-importance evident in the one who complains of discrimination, for he pretends to make himself the object of an Intransitive Verb. This gives rise to one of the most awkward and tortured phrases of modern English: "I was discriminated against." We may see the linguistic folly of this expression by way of comparison with another personal trait that is expressed in a Verb Intransitive. Suppose one lay awake at night unable to sleep due to a constant dripping at the faucet. Suppose the plumber had been called that day, and also every day that week. In complaining of his problem to his friends, this one hardly would express, "I was procrastinated against." The problem is not that the plumber relishes in the thought of this one anguishing under a relentless dripping. The problem is that the plumber does not entertain a thought of this fellow at all, or that his thoughts of others rise higher than his thoughts of this fellow.

It is lamentable enough that the phrase "I was discriminated against" is not met with puzzled winces and instead is accepted without reservation as meaningful. But what is worse, utterance of this phrase immediately is taken as legitimate grounds of some claim of entitlement. The true thought and focus of discrimination is upon the goal of grasping the best. Prominent place in the mind of the discriminator is reserved for that thing or person who fulfills the criteria of his standard. The thing or person who is passed over enjoys notice only to the extent necessary to be ruled out. Seeking after the superior is the de jure agenda; excluding the inferior is the de facto result. It is said that most people would rather be hated than ignored. A prime indication that many of the excluded do not care to do the hard work required to become qualified for future possible selection is the dramatic manner in which they pretend instead to be the object of the discriminator's hatred. In this way would they pretend to transfer the brunt of the problem from their own lack of qualification onto the motives of the discriminator. What makes such protest appear all the more ludicrous is that it comprises a tacit endorsement of the discriminator's standards. The discriminator is not cast as wanting the wrong things, but as hating the rejected and being motivated mainly by the desire to persecute him. Thankfully, in the commercial sphere the personal quality of discrimination still is recognized for what it is in truth, and the desire for technical excellence and the accommodation of aesthetic preference still are rewarded instead of ridiculed.